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The unsuccessful attempted coup launched on the night of September 
30, 1965, set in motion a process which rapidly destroyed the regime 
of Guided Democracy and gave the Army hegemony over the succeeding 
political order. First, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was 
physically decimated and eliminated as a contender for power. 
Subsequently, President Sukarno, deprived of his most effective 
ally in limiting the Army's political strength, was gradually driven 
from the political arena: in March 1966, he was forced to sign over 
wide powers to the Army's leader, General Suharto; and in March 1967, 
he was removed from the presidential office for his continued refusal 
to submit abjectly to military control.
In fact, as early as March 1966, the Army effectively dominated 
Indonesian politics and government, and it was clear that it would 
face no serious rival for the foreseeable future. Inevitably, the 
question soon arose as to what it would do with the unquestioned 
power it had acquired. It soon became apparent that two schools of 
thought existed within the military leadership, one of which proposed 
using the Army's power to undertake a drastic overhaul of the entire 
political system, while the other believed that the top priorities 
were stabilization and consolidation.
The differences between the two groups were perhaps most clearly 
and concretely expressed in their attitudes towards the parties and 
the party system. The first group, who came to be known as the "New 
Order radicals," not only wanted to eliminate Sukarno and the PKI from 
political life, but were also determined to destroy the influence of 
parties like the PNI (Nationalist Party) and the NU (Muslim Scholars' 
Party), which, in their view, had collaborated in constructing Sukarno's 
Nasakom-based Guided Democracy.1 They therefore strongly attacked 
the idea of creating a post-Sukarno party system differentiated from 
its predecessor merely in the absence of the PKI ("Nasakom minus 
Korn"). They urged rather the establishment of a completely new 
political system which would permit non-party leaders committed to 
modernization to come to the fore. Their ideas on how this objective 
could be achieved were less clear, though some of them favored the 
development of a two-party system, in which the parties would be based 
on "programs" rather than on "ideology." While they insisted that 
their aim was the restoration of "true" democracy in Indonesia, in 
practice the logic of their position pushed them to demand severe 
measures against the major existing parties.
The second group viewed the parties and the party system very 
differently. In their view, Indonesian society was fundamentally
1. Nasakom stands for Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme--Nationalism, 
Religion and Communism. "Nasakom system" means a political order 
based on the cooperation of the three political "ideologies."
* A somewhat different version of this article appeared in Australia's 
Neighbours, No. 73 (January-February 1971).
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divided into a number of geographic, cultural and other communities, 
whose political aspirations found natural outlets in the existing 
parties. Thus the conservative Muslims of Java expressed themselves 
through the NU; the more modern through the Masjumi and its successor, 
Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party); the abangan upper stratum (prijaji) 
and its clienteles through the PNI; and much of the abangan peasantry 
through the PKI. The parties had developed deep roots in their 
respective cultural communities which it would be difficult and dan­
gerous to pull up. It was better, therefore, except in the case of 
the PKI, to leave the well-established parties as natural vehicles of 
communication between the government and the people rather than to 
create new, artificial instruments for the expression of political 
interests. In addition, it was expected that the existence of a num­
ber of competing political parties whose leaders were known for their 
opportunism would act as a guarantee against the development of an 
effective and united civilian opposition. Thus, the military would 
be able to "divide and rule." More specifically, in their view, the 
army had an interest in retaining a strong abangan party to balance 
the strength of organized Islam.
The question of what attitude should be taken towards the politi­
cal parties was intimately related to the matter of elections. Should 
elections be held at all, and if they were, should the electoral 
system be regulated in such a way as to benefit the existing parties 
or to move towards restructuring the old political constellation? In 
the evolution of Army (and thus governmental) policy on the elections 
question one can see the pull-and-tug of the two perspectives out­
lined above.
The decision that elections would be held was formally taken by 
the MPRS (Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) at its first 
session after the coup, held in June and July 1966. The Army had 
initially been reluctant to promise elections. In an interview 
shortly before the MPRS session, General Suharto expressed this 
reluctance clearly:
General elections can only be held if the requirements 
and conditions are ready. General elections are not 
important if they do not guarantee the democratic 
rights of the people free from fear and threats and 
free from direct and indirect compulsion. To guarantee 
healthy democratic rights, physical security and 
political security are needed.2
In the circumstances of 1966, the Army's caution was understandable. 
Throughout that year, political tension was extremely high--anti- 
Sukarno forces confronted the pro-Sukarnoists, and, in many areas, 
especially in Java, small-scale physical conflicts erupted between 
Muslim and nationalist youth organizations. The holding of elections 
in such circumstances could well have led to heightened physical 
conflict. Second, from the Army's point of view, there was a real 
danger that supporters of Sukarno would do too well if elections 
were held too quickly. With these considerations in mind, the Home 
Minister, Major-General Basuki Rachmat told the MPRS session that the
2. Interview with The Statesman (Calcutta), reproduced in Djenderal 
dengan Wartawan (Solo: n'.p'. , 1966), p. 17.
elected MPR3 should meet in about three years time, thereby implying 
a delay of nearly three years before the elections would be held. 
However, most civilian groups attending the MPRS session opposed 
delay. The Islamic parties in particular called for elections by 
the end of 1967 and they were supported by various cilivian action 
fronts which had sprung up after the coup attempt.4 Eventually, a 
compromise was reached, and the MPRS decided that elections would be 
held at the latest by July 1968. The government and the DPR-GR 
(Parliament)^were given the task of preparing the election laws.
With the acceptance of the principle that elections would be held, 
attention now turned to the elctoral system. In August, shortly after 
the MPRS session, the Army held a seminar at Bandung. The purpose 
of the seminar was to enable the Army to work out its ideas on its 
role in^society; for though the Army had now become the dominant force 
in the government, it had yet to formulate a clear program of action. 
Among the questions for discussion were the coming elections and the 
party system.
In the published conclusions reached by the seminar,5 6 the views 
of the "New Order radicals" seem in the ascendant. The Army expressed 
something less than enthusiasm about the holding of the elections: 
"Endeavors to achieve political stabilization can be obstructed by 
activities before, at the time of, and after the elections. The 
elections and its results are not really major goals but just means 
for achieving greater stability in all fields."5 There was no point 
in holding elections if the New Order forces did not win: "It is
very clear that the Pantja Sila forces must be victorious in the 
General Elections."7 To ensure victory for the New Order, the Army 
seminar proposed that in contrast with the proportional representa­
tion system that had operated in the 1955 elections, the elections 
now be held on the basis of single-member constituencies with the 
condition that every candidate would have to have lived for at least 
the previous year in the district he was contesting. Under this 
system it could be expected that locally-popular non-party candidates 
would have a better chance of success than under proportional 
representation, which would undoubtedly give the established parties 
an overwhelming majority of seats. The seminar also proposed a 
simplification of the party system with the formation of five groups-- 
Islamic, Christian, Nationalist, Socialist Pantja Sila and Functional.8
179
3. The MPRS is appointed. After the elections the body will be known 
as the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly); the "S" stands for 
sementara (provisional).
4. Information on the stands of the various factions in the MPRS is 
contained in the unpublished Risalah for the fourth general 
session, 1966.
5. Sumbangan Fikiran TNI-AD kepada Kabinet Ampera (Djakarta: Angkatan 
Darat, n.d.j.
6. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
7 . Ibid., p . 49.
8. Ibid. , pp. 41-42 .
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While the seminar supported the disqualification of former members of 
the PKI and its mass organizations as either voters or candidates, 
it stated that former members of the banned Masjumi, PSI (Indonesian 
Socialist Party) and Murba were still citizens with the rights of 
citizens.9 In addition, it implied that members of the armed forces 
could also contest the elections.10
The conclusions of the Army seminar were not warmly received by 
the political parties. The Army proposals seemed aimed at breaking 
the hold of -the old parties by insisting on single-member constitu­
encies with a residency requirement, which would increase the chances 
of non-party candidates. In addition, such an electoral system 
would be more amenable to local military pressure than would a sys­
tem based on proportional representation in province-wide constitu­
encies., The encouragement given to members of the previously banned 
parties to participate in the elections suggested backing for 
their strong anti-Old Order attitudes.
Three bills11 now sent to Parliament relating to the coming 
elections reflected in part the results of the Army seminar. The 
first was the Parties, Mass Organizations and Functional Groups Bill. 
Its essential purpose was to "simplify" the party system by estab­
lishing conditions for electoral recognition that might be hard to 
meet for the smaller parties or a grouping of parties unacceptable 
to the big parties. To be recognized, a party had to have at least 
1.5 million members, as well as branches in at least half of the 
25 provinces and in at least half of the more than 200 districts 
(kabupaten). In addition, to remain in existence after the elections, 
a party would need to win at least two percent of the seats in the 
DPR (Parliament), a condition more easily met by smaller parties 
under proportional representation than under a single-member con­
stituency system. Apart from these provisions aimed at eliminating 
the smaller parties, the bill somewhat ambiguously declared that the 
parties were divided into three groups --nationalist, religious and 
"socialist Pantja Sila." In the statement accompanying the bill, it 
was explained that the purpose was to encourage parties with similar 
principles to join together, "whether the organization takes the 
form of a confederation, federation or fusion." As could be expected, 
this provision, which appeared to presage a forced unification of 
parties, met with the opposition of ali the political parties, both 
large and small.
Apart from opposition by the existing parties, the absence of 
any provision for the foundation of new parties or organizations of 
functional groups aroused the opposition of independents and sup­
porters of banned parties such as the Masjumi and PSI. These groups 
were supported by the BPC Siliwangi (Body to Develop the Corps of the 
Siliwangi Division) which was thought to reflect the views of the 
militantly New Order commander of the Siliwangi Division, Major- 
General Dharsono. The BPC Siliwangi called for "the possibility of 
a new organization for independent figures of the New Order."12 The
9. Ibid., p . 42.
10. Ibid., p . 60.
11. Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum (Djakarta: Sekretariat DPR-GR, 1970).
12. Nusantara, May 8, 1967.
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bill was thus regarded as too radical by the old political parties, 
while, at the same time, one of its provisions failed to satisfy the 
"New Order radicals" themselves. After a month of fruitless discus­
sion early in 1967 it was decided that it would be better to come 
back to this bill after the other two bills had been completed. In 
any case, it was felt, the elections could still be held even if 
this particular bill were never passed.
Discussion then moved to the General Elections Bill and the 
Structure and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD (regional DPR) Bill. 
The General Elections Bill was intended to regulate matters such as 
the electoral system and qualifications for candidates and voters.
In accordance with the ideas expressed at the Army seminar, the 
national parliament was to be elected on the basis of single-member 
constituencies, each constituency covering one district (kabupaten 
or city). A simple majority system would be used. According to 
the statement accompanying the bill, this was suggested "bearing 
in mind the bitter experience of the period of general elections 
according to the proportional system." The principle of residency, 
as proposed by the Army seminar, was accepted in the bill, although 
the period eventually required was only six months, not a year as 
originally proposed. All candidates had to be nominated by a 
recognized party or functional group. Thus completely independent 
candidates could not stand,but candidates independent of the parties 
could. In contrast with the earlier proposals of the Army seminar, 
members of the armed forces would not be permitted to take part in 
the elections (however, they would be amply compensated under the 
terms of the third bill) .
The Structure and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD Bill pro­
vided that half of the members of each body would represent the 
political parties and half functional groups. Of the functional 
groups, half would represent the armed forces (i.e., twenty-five 
percent of the total members of the body). The armed forces members 
would be appointed on the nomination of the commanders of the four 
forces. The bill was not altogether clear on how the balance 
between parties and functional groups was to be maintained among the 
civilian members, who, it appears, would all compete in the same 
constituencies during the elections. What would happen if the 
parties won more than half of the seats or less than half? Possibly 
the balance would be made up with further appointments, although 
this was not clear from the bill's wording.
Both of these bills met heavy opposition from the major political 
parties in parliament. In particular, the parties strongly opposed 
the single-member constituency system. They demanded multi-member 
province-wide constituencies based on proportional representation 
without a residency qualification. Under this system, the contest 
would not be between individuals competing for local votes but 
between party lists; accordingly, the parties, with their province­
wide organizations, would do much better than locally-popular non- 
party candidates. Apart from the question of the electoral system, 
the other major controversy was over the twenty-five percent quota 
for the military. The civilians as a whole were opposed to so many 
military appointees.
In responding to criticism by the political parties and other 
civilian groups, the government proved to be quite flexible. The
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principles announced at the Army seminar were quickly abandoned, al­
though the government's withdrawal was by no means a surrender, After 
discussions lasting a number of months, agreement on basic principles 
between the government and the parliament was reached in July 1967.
The agreement consisted of twelve points known as a "package."13 On 
the government side, the parties' demands for proportional representa­
tion with multi-member province-wide constituencies and the abolition 
of the residency requirement were accepted. On the other hand, the 
parties made concessions on the question of appointment. The number 
of appointed members of the MPR would be raised to one-third, while 
100 of the 460 members of the DPR (22 percent) were to be appointed.
In addition, it was agreed that the government would have the right 
to appoint civilians who were not members of parties or organized 
functional groups.
Following this agreement, discussions continued on the General 
Elections Bill, which was completed and ready for passage in November 
1967. Apart from the stipulation regarding the size of constituencies 
and proportional representation, this bill also contained a number of 
other provisions which were to some degree controversial. First, the 
bill declared that former members of the PKI or its mass organiza­
tions, as well as "other banned organizations" would not be permitted 
to participate as candidates or voters in the elections. This pro­
vision was important for those parties which had hoped to attract 
the votes of former supporters of the PKI. It also raised the issue 
of what was meant by "other banned organizations." Former members 
of Masjumi and PSI quickly pointed out that their parties had never 
been banned but had dissolved themselves (in the face of the threat 
of being banned, of course). This provision also seemed to be a 
step away from the conclusions of the Army seminar, which clearly 
supported the rights of former Masjumi and PSI members to participate 
in the elections. Another provision which was to some extent con­
troversial was added to the bill as a result of the failure to reach 
agreement on the bill regulating parties, mass organizations and 
functional groups. This provision (clause 34) declared that only 
recognized parties and functional groups that already had representa­
tives in the appointed parliament could contest the elections. This 
provision was opposed by the independents who had been appointed to 
parliament since the coup. However, they were forced to yield on 
this issue.
Thus, by November 1967, the General Elections Bill had been dis­
cussed and agreement had been reached. The bill was very different 
to that which had been envisaged at the Army seminar and the sympathe­
tic attitude to the former members of Masjumi and PSI was no longer 
apparent. The decline of New Order radical influence was indicated by 
the government's clear inclination to see co-operation of the big 
political parties as more important than the aspirations of the small 
group of modernizing intellectuals.
It had been planned to pass the bill formally on November 27, 
1967. However, it now met with an unexpectedly strong reaction from 
the New Order civilian forces outside parliament. The Bandung and 
Djakarta branches of the "scholars'" action front, KASI, declared 
jointly:
13. Nusantara, July 31, 1967.
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that the aspirations and struggle of the New 
Order requires an overhaul of the constella­
tion of political life in the homeland leading 
to renewal in all fields of national and social 
life.
In their estimate, the proposed bill did not lead to such a renewal. 
They condemned it as:
the product of horse-trading between Old Order 
forces and forces which put more emphasis on 
sectional interests than on principles and 
ideals .1 *
At the same time students from Bandung demonstrated outside the 
parliament building. In parliament, the independent intellectual 
group argued that the elections bill was part of a "package agreement" 
which also covered the structure bill. In fact, the greatest con­
cessions had been given to the old parties in the elections bill, while 
the parties had given ground in the structure bill. Thus, the inde­
pendents argued, the passage of the elections bill should be postponed 
until the structure bill was also ready for passage. They did not 
want the elections bill to be passed and then find that the parties 
were not prepared to accept the structure bill. In this, the inde­
pendents managed to get the support of the military members as well as 
the Christian parties. Postponement was opposed by the PNI and NU. 
Eventually, it was decided to postpone passage of the bill, but, at 
the same time, it was agreed that the provisions of the bill would be 
considered as settled.
By about the middle of 1967, it had become clear that the laws 
necessary for holding the elections would not be completed in time 
to hold the elections by July 1968, as stipulated by the 1966 MPRS 
session. So, when another MPRS session was held in March 1968, to 
appoint General Suharto as full President, the opportunity was taken 
to formalize the postponement of the elections. At this session, the 
Islamic parties generally favored a short postponement. In particular, 
the new Parmusi party wanted elections within 18 months. The nation­
alist group preferred a three year postponement, while the functional 
groups'representatives wanted one still longer. In particular, the 
independents were opposed to an early election.14 5 Eventually, a com­
promise favorable to the government was reached: it was decided to
hold elections by July 1971, while, at the same time, President 
Suharto was appointed for a five year term, meaning that the elected 
MPR need not meet until 1973 to consider the question of extending 
Suharto's mandate or replacing him.
It was at about this time that the most prominent of the "radical 
New Order" generals, Major-General Dharsono, the commander of West 
Java's Siliwangi division, began to propagate his concept of a "two
14. Nusantara, November 27, 1967.
15. The debates are contained in the unpublished Risalah of the 
fifth general session of the MPRS, 1968.
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party system.” Having lost on the issue of the election laws,
Dharsono now launched a frontal attack on the old parties themselves. 
It was not clear how the two party system could be implemented if 
the parties did not voluntarily dissolve themselves and then re-form 
in two parties, and it was quite clear that the parties would not do 
this. In the face of strong opposition, Dharsono modified his ideas, 
proposing a ’’two group system” in which the parties would not have to 
dissolve themselves immediately but would simply form two groups in 
the parliament and other representative bodies, one group supporting 
the government and the other acting as a loyal and constructive onposi 
tion. At first, the central government eyed DharsonoTs ideas with 
interest. If Dharsono had been able to persuade the parties to form 
two groups, the government’s interests in stabilization would not 
have been jeopardized. But when in 1969, two group systems suddenly 
began to emerge in local assemblies throughout West Java, it was 
clear that as much force as persuasion was being used. Dharsono’s 
approach to the parties now clearly conflicted with that of the 
central government and he was sent to Bangkok as ambassador.
Meanwhile, after the postponement of the date of the elections, 
parliament returned to the job of preparing the details of the 
preparatory legislation. The government worked up a substantially 
revised draft of the structure bill, which was returned to parliament 
early in 1968. Discussion of this bill was drawn out over nearly 
two years. The essential provisions conformed to the package agree­
ment of 1967. The DPR would consist of 360 elected members and 100 
appointees (it being understood that 75 of these would represent the 
armed forces). All the members of the DPR would also be members of 
the MPR which would have twice as many members as the DPR. The govern 
ment would appoint one-third of the MPR members (in contrast with 
22 percent of the DPR). In addition, the provincial DPR would elect 
regional representatives to the MPR. The remaining seats would be 
divided among the parties and functional groups on the basis of the 
election results. The bill also contained provisions dealing with 
the regional parliaments.
While the essential features of the bill had been agreed upon 
in the 1967 package, there still remained a number of relatively 
marginal issues on which it was difficult to reach agreement, there­
by causing the discussion of the bill to drag out until the end of 
1969. The most difficult issue did not in fact involve the MPR and 
DPR at all but the regional parliaments. The government asked that 
20 percent of their members be appointed. On this question, the 
smaller parties and functional groups supported the government while
the big parties (PNI , NU and Parmusi) were strongly opposed, and
demanded a reduction in the number of appointees. Meanwhile the in­
dependents in the functional groups were once again bringing up the 
question of clause 34 of the General Elections Bill which prevented 
organizations not already represented in parliament from contesting 
the elections. It seemed that there was an inexhaustible reserve of 
’’crucial points” which could be brought out one by one as each pre­
vious crucial point was settled. Indeed some observers felt that 
the government was deliberately bringing up these points in an 
attempt to have the elections postponed once again. It was in this
atmosphere that the President held separate talks with each of the
political parties and the Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of 
Functional Groups). The upshot was that, in November, parliament 
suddenly agreed, although somewhat reluctantly, to the government 
view that 20 percent of the members of the regional parliaments 
should be appointed. The two bills were then passed.
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The development of the government's position on the election 
laws between the period of the Army seminar and that of the package 
agreement reflects a slowly evolving decision against a thorough 
re-structuring of the political system and for a stabilization of 
the existing system. There are two basic reasons why the decision 
went the way it did. In the first place, the Army was not fully 
confident of its own cohesion and moreover, despite the Army seminar, 
still had little idea of what reforms it really might want to under­
take. Without a clear and cogent blue-print for the future, it 
could not expect that the armed forces would be united in implementing 
any drastic program. Rather than launch such a program which would 
certainly exacerbate existing tensions in society and might easily 
spread into the military itself, the Army leaders decided to play it 
safe. Second, the military leadership was anxious to maintain a 
reasonably wide base of civilian support. If drastic action were 
taken to limit the role of the large parties, the government's 
civilian base would probably shrink to the more modern elements in 
the cities. It was not that the Army leaders were afraid that the 
PNI and NU masses might force them out of power; rather, they believed 
that the process of running the government, especially in the regions, 
would be much easier with the cooperation of the large parties. Than 
without it. In addition, they came to the conclusion that stability 
in the legislative bodies about to be elected would best be assured 
by an alliance with the larger parties. There was thus every reason 
to be willing to make concessions on the electoral laws which 
favored these parties, provided that these parties' leadership 
remained as "manageable" as hitherto. To make sure that these 
expectations would bear fruit, the Army now turned to the task 
of extending its influence deep inside the larger parties and in 
the electoral system as a whole.
The PNI
The PNI had long been close to President Sukarno. Like Sukarno, 
it had cooperated with the PKI in the period before the coup.
However, cooperation with the PKI was easier in Djakarta than in the 
regions where the PNI and the PKI competed for mass support. Both 
the PNI and PKI had their strongholds in Central and East Java. In 
1964 and 1965, open conflict between the two had broken out in 
Central Java causing a split in the PNI between the supporters of the 
central leadership's line of cooperation with the PKI and the local 
leadership's opposition to this entente. This split was formalized 
in the days after the coup when a rival party was formed. However, 
at this stage, it appeared that the majority of the PNI remained 
loyal to the central leadership headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo. In 
addition, the central leaders had the support of President Sukarno.
However, in March 1966, after President Sukarno had been forced 
to yield virtually all his power, General Suharto took steps to 
reverse this tendency and to "re-unite" the PNI on his own terms.
This aim was achieved at the party congress held at Bandung in 
April 1966. There was undoubtedly local military interference in the 
selection of delegates to this congress and the sessions were 
"guarded" by KAMI students and troops from the Siliwangi division.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the "rebel" group headed by Osa Maliki 
emerged victorious after several hectic sessions.
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While the Osa Maliki group clearly had Suharto's support, it was 
still identified with the Old Order, especially in the eyes of Muslim 
students, KAMI and other New Order militants. The reunified PNI's 
identification with the Old Order was maintained by its reluctance to 
attack and even its willingness to defend Sukarno in 1966 and early 
1967. As a result, demands arose for the banning of the PNI and 
some of the militant New Order territorial commanders "froze" the PNI 
in their areas. By late 1967, the PNI had been "frozen" throughout 
Sumatra and its activities had been severely circumscribed in other 
areas. In the face of such challenges to the very existence of the 
PNI, Suharto issued an instruction in December 1967 ordering local 
military commanders to aid the PNI in "reforming" itself. Suharto 
regarded the PNI as the natural vehicle for the expression of the 
political aspirations of the non-Islamic masses of Java and other 
areas, further, the PNI had an important role in balancing the power 
of the Muslim parties. Thus the existence of the PNI had to be de­
fended and was indeed effectively protected.
In 1969, Osa Maliki died. The two leading candidates to replace 
him were the Central Java chairman, Hadisubeno, and the Djakarta 
leader, Hardi. Hadisubeno had excellent relations with Suharto 
dating back to the late 1950's when Hadisubeno was mayor of Semarang 
and Suharto was the military commander of Central Java with his head­
quarters in Semarang. On the other hand, Hardi had been a national 
leader of the party for many years and had held the position of First 
Deputy Prime Minister in the last cabinet before the introduction of 
Guided Democracy in 1959. Hadisubeno took the position that the PNI 
had to cultivate good relations with the Army in the present circum­
stances, while Hardi emphasized the independent role that the 
parties had to play in creating democracy. It is clear that the 
government found Hadisubeno's line much more palatable than Hardi's. 
At the party congress held at Semarang in April 1970, Hadisubeno 
was victorious. But it was apparent that Hadisubeno's victory had 
been in part engineered by forces outside the party. It was widely 
reported that members of Opsus16 had applied all kinds of pressure 
on delegates at the congress to ensure Hadisubeno's triumph. Thus, 
for the second time the government had intervened in the affairs of 
the PNI to bring about the election of an amenable leader.
The NU
The Nahdatul Ulama is a conservative Muslim party with its main 
base in East Java. After the banning of the Masjumi in 1960, it 
became the major Muslim party. Its leaders had little difficulty in
16. Opsus (Operasi Chusus, Special Operations) is an all-purpose in­
telligence organization headed by President Suharto's personal 
assistant, Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo. Its original mission 
was to send out peace feelers during the confrontation with 
Malaysia. Other special operations have involved it in the stu­
dent demonstrations against the PKI and Sukarno, the Act of Free 
Choice in West Irian, contacts with South Vietnam and Formosa, 
etc. It has also acted to ensure that the political parties and 
other organizations have amenable leaders.
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adjusting themselves to Sukarno's Guided Democracy, and many of them 
held high positions in successive cabinets. After the coup, it was 
members of the NU in East Java who were primarily responsible for 
the huge number of communists massacred in that area. However, they 
remained loyal to President Sukarno until the middle of 1966 when 
it appeared that the balance was tipping against the President.
Later, in early 1967, it was the NU which took the lead in condemning 
the President and demanding that he be brought to trial. (The NU 
thus demonstrated a well-developed capacity to adjust itself to 
changing times.)
When the NU held its first post-coup congress in the middle of 
1967, New Order militants outside the party hoped that the old leader­
ship would be replaced by younger elements with "clean" records, such 
as Subchan, the Deputy Chairman of the MPRS. However, the old 
leadership had no trouble defending its position. Idham Chalid, who 
had been a minister through all the changes that had occurred since 
the 1950's, remained the leader of the party. By contrast with the 
case of the PNI, the authorities saw no reason to intervene in the 
affairs of the NU. They were sure that they would encounter no 
difficulties in dealing with Idham Chalid and his associates.
The Parmusi
Indonesian Islam has long been divided politically into two main 
streams--the traditional NU based on the rural areas of Java, and 
a more modern stream based on the towns and the areas outside Java.
In the past, the more modern stream was represented by the Masjumi. 
After the banning of the Masjumi in 1960, the aspirations of this 
stream did not find adequate political expression. After the coup, 
former Masjumi leaders began to explore ways to bring the Masjumi 
back to life, since they believed that the former Masjumi masses 
had not switched their loyalties to the NU, and by 1967 it was clear 
that the government espoused the view that the political parties 
should continue to play a significant role in political life. The 
straightforward re-legalization of Masjumi was not acceptable to 
many generals who still remembered that Masjumi leaders had been 
associated with the PRRI-Permesta rebellion of 1958 that had led 
to the loss of many soldiers' lives.
However, the government did eventually agree to permit the forma 
tion of a new party that would base itself on the former Masjumi 
masses, provided it was not led by men who had held senior positions 
in Masjumi. In late 1967, the prospective formers of the proposed 
party presented a series of lists of leaders, all of which were 
rejected by the government because they included people considered 
to have been high in Masjumi. Eventually, in February 1968, the 
proto-party backed down completely and submitted a list acceptable 
to the government. In return, it obtained legal recognition.
The acceptable leadership,headed by Djarnawi Hadikusumo, had 
been put forward, with the understanding, at least on the side of 
the party, that it was a temporary leadership which could be re­
placed at the party's first congress to be held later in the year.
It soon became clear that this understanding was not shared by 
the government. When the Parmusi held its congress in Malang in
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November 1968, it ignored government warnings and elected Mohammed 
Roem, one of the most senior of the top ex-Masjumi leaders,to the 
position of party chairman. The government refused to recognize 
Roem and continued to work with the old leadership, under K. H. 
Djarnawi, agreed upon the previous February. While some elements 
in Parmusi did not want to resign themselves to this reality, most 
accepted the fact that they had little alternative. Thus the govern­
ment simply ignored the election of a party leader over whom it felt it 
might have difficulty in exercising control.
For a year, this situation remained unchanged. However, after 
the passage of the election laws at the end of 1969, Parmusi began 
to concentrate seriously on mobilizing its supporters for the oncoming 
election. In pursuing this task, the government-approved leaders 
of the party found themselves increasingly forced to rely on former 
Masjumi leaders, like Roem, who had far more influence over the 
potential supporters of the party than they. Government concern 
over this development was probably heightened by the fact that in the 
outer regions, sections of the party under strong influence of ex- 
Masjumi leaders were taking an increasingly critical stance towards 
the Army and the government.
Then in October 1970 one of the party's deputy chairmen, John 
Naro, announced that he had taken over the leadership of Parmusi.
He claimed that the Djarnawi leadership had adopted a line that was 
bringing the party into conflict with the government. It is 
significant that in the preceding months Naro and his chief associ­
ate had been under criticism within Parmusi because of their close 
contacts with Opsus. Many observers believed Naro's "coup" to have 
been the work of Opsus.
In the weeks that followed, the Minister of the Interior and 
the Head of Bakin, the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body (both 
generals),held discussions with the rival groups and extracted an 
agreement from both to leave the solution of the leadership problem 
to the President to solve. Eventually the President appointed one 
of his Ministers, Mintaredja, to head Parmusi and "heal the breach." 
(This appointment was welcomed by the Naro group but rejected by 
Djarnawi and his allies.)
While the government had thus succeeded in installing its own 
man as chairman of Parmusi, the means by which this had been achieved 
were so transparent that many of the Djarnawi and Roem supporters 
will probably, out of disgust, no longer participate in the party's 
activities and thus weaken Parmusi very seriously.
Thus in the case of each of the three largest parties, the 
government has ensured that they will enter the election campaign 
with amenable leaders. The NU elected such a leadership voluntarily. 
The PNI did so as a result of heavy pressure. In the case of 
Parmusi, the election of one unacceptable leader was ignored by the 
government and a substitute leader, who eventually became unaccept­
able, was pushed out after a government-provoked split in the party. 
Accordingly, not much serious opposition can be expected from the 
leadership of these parties. If this is the case with the large 
parties, it is even more true of the smaller parties.
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Sekber-Golkar
Aside from the great influence which it has established over the 
political parties, the government has sponsored what is in effect its 
own political party, the Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (Sekbar- 
Golkar--Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups). The Sekber-Golkar 
is a federation of organizations, such as trade unions, students', 
women's and veterans' organizations not affiliated to political 
parties. It was founded in 1964 as an alliance of functional groups 
under Army influence for the purpose of opposing the communists 
within the National Front. After the coup, it lost its raison 
d'etre; but with the decision to hold elections, it found a new one. 
Its main leaders today are army officers who, by the terms of the 
election laws, may not contest the elections or take part in the 
campaign. However, as leaders of Sekber-Golkar, they are able to 
influence the selection of the candidates. In many areas, it can 
be expected that the Sekber-Golkar candidates will obtain the 
"backing" of local military commanders. It is generally believed 
therefore that the Sekber-Golkar will be among the "big four" when 
the election results are announced.
Accordingly, the fact that only a minority (although a sizeable 
minority) of the MPR and DPR will be appointed should not be too 
great an obstacle for the government after the elections. With the 
Sekber-Golkar as the government party and the other major parties 
under amenable leadership, the government should have little dif­
ficulty in having its legislation approved by parliament. Similarly, 
when the MPR elects the President in 1973, there can be no doubt 
that the Army's candidate will win.
* * * * * * * * * * *
Two basic elements can be seen in the government's attitude 
towards the political parties since 1967. First, it sees a need 
to permit the civilian parties to function as natural means of 
political expression and as links between the government and the 
people. It has been concerned to ensure that the major socio­
cultural communities feel that they are represented in national 
politics, since it fears that if some major community feels un­
represented it will eventually become alienated from the government 
and will become a fertile bas« for political disturbances and worse. 
In the past, as shown in the 1955 elections, the main communities 
gave their support to the four main parties. The problem today, 
in the government's view, is to make sure that each major community 
feels that there is still some vehicle through which its aspirations 
can be articulated. Secondly, the government is determined to 
prevent such vehicles from posing any real threat to its own 
authority.
What has the government done to achieve these twin objectives?
In the case of the NU, with its base among the traditionalist 
Muslims of Java, there was no need to do anything, as the party's 
leaders willingly transferred their support from the old to the 
new government and carried their followings with them. The 
problem of the supporters of the Masjumi, which had in effect been 
banned by Sukarno in 1960, was more complex. The former Masjumi 
leaders were still regarded with much suspicion by the Army leaders.
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At the same time, it was felt essential that former Masjumi supporters, 
who had long been the dominant political group in the Outer Islands, 
should not remain unrepresented. Thus Parmusi was born, a body with­
out a head, so to speak, as former Masjumi leaders were not permitted 
to lead the new party. In the case of the PNI, even more drastic 
action was taken. The old head had to be chopped off at the party's 
congress at Bandung in 1966. Then,in 1970, further intervention 
took place to ensure the election of an acceptable leader. These 
heavy-handed interventions have been required precisely because of 
the central roles the party is to play in the government's stabiliza­
tion. First, it must maintain its old role of representing its tradi­
tional clientele. Second, as the only large non-Muslim party, it is 
needed to balance the power of Islam. Thirdly, with the elimination 
of the PKI as an active party, a channel is required for the aspira­
tions of its erstwhile supporters. Since former PKI supporters are 
generally hostile to the Islamic groups, and since they tend to come 
from the abangan milieu from which the PNI also draws its strength, 
it is hoped that many of them will transfer their allegiance to the 
PNI, rather than remain completely outside the political system.
How far have the government's long-range twin objectives been accom­
plished?
The objective of ensuring that the political parties are unable 
to mount a serious concerted challenge to the government has largely 
been achieved. The parties have in the past been unable to cooperate 
effectively. The basic line of cleavage has been between the Muslim 
and the secular parties, but even within the Muslim camp, the NU and 
Masjumi/Parmusi have normally been at loggerheads. Thus, in permit­
ting the parties toicontinue in existence, the government can rea­
sonably count on their being too divided to act in concerted opposi­
tion. At the same time, the government has repeatedly interfered 
in the internal affairs of the parties to ensure the election of 
compliant leaders. The result is that all the parties are now led 
by men who have neither the desire nor the capacity to challenge the 
dominant role of the Army. Men like Hardi, Subchan and Roem, who 
might, conceivably, have cooperated against the military, have, by 
one means or another, been shunted to the sidelines. Similar inter­
ventions have taken place in the smaller parties.
But with regard to its second objective, making the parties 
function effectively as links between the government and the people, 
the government's achievements are much less clear. Of the big 
parties, only the NU has been able to select leaders acceptable to 
the government on its own. In the cases of the Parmusi and the PNI, 
government intervention was needed to secure this result. Thus we 
must ask whether the Parmusi and PNI are really playing or can play 
genuinely representative linking roles.
In the case of Parmusi, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
former Masjumi leaders command much greater respect among the masses 
than do the present party heads. It can therefore be wondered 
whether the former Masjumi constituency feels that the Parmusi with­
out the old Masjumi leaders can really express its aspirations. It 
is probable that many former Masjumi supporters dismiss the present 
Parmusi leaders as government "stooges." In the case of the PNI, two 
questions arise. The first is to what extent the present leaders 
represent the party's mass following. In 1966, when Ali 
Sastroamidjojo was overthrown as a result of military intervention 
at the PNI congress, it appeared that the masses were still loyal to
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Ali, who was regarded as close to Sukarno. Possibly the election in 
1970 of Hadisubeno, with his anti-Islamic and somewhat "Sukarnoist" 
image,17 will help to win back the old supporters of the party. 
Secondly, can the PNI capture the loyalty of former communist sup­
porters? It has been estimated that, in 1965, the PKI had roughly 
three million members and that there were 15 million people involved 
in its mass organizations. According to the election laws, former 
members of communist organizations will not be permitted to vote 
in the elections. However, by the middle of 1970, only 1.7 million 
citizens had. been declared ineligible on these grounds.18 Even if 
we make allowance for up to half a million or so massacred after the 
coup and perhaps another 100,000 still in prison, it appears that 
many former supporters of the PKI will have the right to vote. Will 
they permit themselves to be drawn back into the political system 
by exercising their vote or will they remain apathetic and alienated? 
It is the PNI which has the greatest potential for bringing them 
back into the system,but it is as yet uncertain whether this 
potential will be realized.
In conclusion, we can say that the government has succeeded in 
its short-run goal of taming the political parties in Djakarta.
The question that remains is how far the present political parties 
represent the people outside Djakarta.
17. After his election as party chairman, Hadisubeno told his sup­
porters "not to forget who 'dug up* Pantja Sila" (i.e., 
Sukarno) and warned that Pantja Sila was endangered by the 
kaum sarungan, or the people wearing sarongs (i.e., Muslims).
18. Kompas, July 4, 1970.

